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Abstract: This paper presents and defends a model of religious faith as an 
epistemic disposition. According to the model, religious faith is a disposition to 
take certain doxastic attitudes toward propositions of religious significance upon 
entertaining certain mental states. Three distinct advantages of the model are 
advanced. First, the model allows for religious faith to explain the presence and 
epistemic appropriateness of religious belief. Second, the model accommodates 
a variety of historically significant perspectives concerning the relationships 
between faith and evidence, faith and volition, and faith and doubt. And, finally, 
the model offers an appealing account of what unifies religious faith with other 
kinds of faith.
INTroDuCTIoN
In this paper, I will explicate and defend a model of religious faith 
according to which religious faith is an example of what I call an epistemic 
disposition. In the first section, I explain what epistemic dispositions are 
and say how in very general terms religious faith might be understood as 
one of these dispositions. In sections two through four I highlight some 
of the central advantages of modelling religious faith in this way. Section 
two focuses on the present model’s ability to accommodate the apparent 
explanatory priority of religious faith to religious belief. It shows how on 
the present model it could be that a person holds religious beliefs because 
she has religious faith, and how on the present model it could be that 
a person’s holding of religious beliefs might be epistemically appropriate 
because of her religious faith. Section three focuses on the present 
model’s ability to accommodate a variety of historically significant 
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perspectives concerning the relationships between faith and evidence, 
faith and volition, and faith and doubt. It is a boon of the present model 
that it does not rule out historically significant and opposing answers 
to questions about these relationships. Finally, I conclude the paper by 
reflecting on the relationship between religious faith modelled in the 
way proposed here and other kinds of faith. I show that the model of 
religious faith proposed here might be modified so as to yield attractive 
models of faith in other domains as well, thereby yielding an explanation 
of what unifies our talk of faith in these various areas.
I. ePISTemIC DISPoSITIoNS AND A GeNerAl moDel
begin with the question of what an epistemic disposition is. To find an 
answer, we need to say something about dispositions in general, since 
epistemic dispositions are just one sub-class of dispositions in general. 
I won’t offer an analysis of what a disposition is, however. For one thing, 
I’m sceptical that this is possible. Attempts to analyse dispositions are 
notoriously suspect.1 but, for another, we don’t need an analysis of 
dispositions here to find a way of distinguishing epistemic dispositions 
from other dispositions which aren’t epistemic dispositions.
All we need, instead, is a handle on what robert Audi (1994) calls 
“realization conditions” and “constitutive manifestations”. To see what 
these two elements involve, consider the paradigm instance of fragility. 
When we ascribe the disposition of fragility to a glass, we are saying that 
there is something about the glass’s nature which makes it likely under 
certain conditions that the glass will break. The realization conditions 
of the glass’s fragility will be conditions involving a certain amount 
of pressure and the constitutive manifestations of the disposition will 
be behaviours involving shattering. Importantly, these realization 
conditions and constitutive manifestations are partially constitutive of the 
disposition of fragility. A disposition whose constitutive manifestations 
don’t involve shattering or breaking in any way is just not the disposition 
of fragility. Dispositions, then, can be partially individuated by their 
realization conditions and constitutive manifestations.
And, indeed, we can individuate epistemic dispositions in just this 
way. What makes a disposition an epistemic disposition is that there 
are certain restrictions on its realization conditions and constitutive 
1 See the review of such attempts in (Fara 2006).
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manifestations. The realization conditions of epistemic dispositions will 
be sets of mental states – sets of beliefs, experiences, emotions, and so on. 
The constitutive manifestations of epistemic dispositions will be doxastic 
attitudes like belief, disbelief, suspension of judgment, and perhaps other 
degreed attitudes if such there be.2 Thus, epistemic dispositions will 
be dispositions in the presence of certain mental states to take certain 
doxastic attitudes.
I call them epistemic dispositions because they are dispositions 
having to do with the way we function as believers. Typically, the way 
that we navigate our experience of the world is by gathering evidence 
and responding to it in a way that makes sense from our perspective. 
our gathering of evidence involves us coming to host mental states like 
beliefs, experiences and so on.3 And, the way we respond to this evidence 
is by taking those attitudes that these mental states dispose us to take.
Some examples may help. one example of an epistemic disposition 
would be my disposition to believe I am seeing a black cat in the presence 
of my having visual experiences as of a black cat. There are a whole range 
of such visual experiences which might trigger – which might act as 
realization conditions for – this disposition. They are all experiences 
like those I would have were I to see a black cat of some kind. And, 
because I have the aforementioned disposition, when I have these kinds 
of experiences, I tend to believe I am seeing a black cat. If I want to know 
whether there’s a black cat around, I’ll gather evidence by looking around 
and then I’ll respond to the evidence I gather by taking those attitudes 
my gathered evidence disposes me to take. Here’s another example: I have 
a disposition, upon feeling horrified or disgusted by a situation, to believe 
that something has gone morally amiss. When contemplating a situation 
engenders these emotions in me, I tend to think that there is something 
morally wrong with the contemplated situation. If I want to know what 
to think about whether there is something wrong about a given scenario, 
2 I am thinking here of degrees of belief. For a brief overview of degrees of belief see 
the discussion of subjective probability in (Hajek 2009) or the various pieces in (Huber 
and Schmidt-Petri 2009). 
3 I do not intend here to make any substantive claim about the nature of evidence. It is 
perhaps easiest to think of evidence on my view as consisting in mental states, along the 
lines proposed in Conee and Feldman (2008). but, if someone prefers to think of evidence 
as consisting in propositions (like, e.g., [Williamson 2000]), I could distinguish between 
the evidence there is – which is a body of propositions – and those mental states whereby 
someone comes to possess that evidence – experiences, beliefs, and so on. 
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one way I can check is by seeing if I respond to the scenario with one of the 
aforementioned emotions and then following the emotion to the attitude 
toward which it leads me. A third example would be my disposition to 
believe a proposition q in the presence of believing a proposition p and 
a  proposition if p then q. When I come to believe p and to believe if 
p then q, I tend to also come to believe q. both this and the foregoing 
examples were examples of epistemic dispositions because they are all 
examples of dispositions whose realization conditions are sets of mental 
states and whose constitutive manifestations are doxastic attitudes.
Now my proposal here is that we understand religious faith as an 
epistemic disposition of this sort. Very generally, religious faith will be 
a disposition in the presence of certain mental states to take certain 
doxastic attitudes toward propositions with religiously significant 
content. I won’t specify here which precise mental states must serve 
as the realization conditions of faith, which precise propositions with 
religiously significant content must be the propositions a person of faith 
is disposed take doxastic attitudes toward, or which doxastic attitudes 
the person of faith must be disposed to take toward these propositions. 
All I will say is that the doxastic attitudes which serve as the constitutive 
manifestations of faith will include what we typically refer to as “religious 
beliefs”.4 Thus, on the present general model, faith is a disposition to hold 
religious beliefs and perhaps other doxastic attitudes toward propositions 
of religious significance in the presence of certain mental states. Call this 
the epistemic disposition model. I will discuss options for filling in the 
details of this general model in section three. but, before doing so, I want 
to remark on the present model’s ability to accommodate the explanatory 
priority of religious faith to religious belief.
II. THe eXPlANATorY PrIorITY oF relIGIouS FAITH 
To relIGIouS belIeF
It is not uncommon for people to talk as if religious faith explains 
something significant about religious belief. I’ll discuss two cases here 
and show how the epistemic disposition model accommodates this idea 
at face value better than do alternative models.
4 by calling them the attitudes we typically refer to as religious beliefs, I intend to leave 
it an open question whether they are beliefs or something else. When I talk of “religious 
belief ” in the following section, it is to be understood in this same way – whatever attitude 
it is that we are talking about when we use appropriately the title “religious belief ”. 
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First, consider the following conversation:
A: b, why do you believe all this stuff about Jesus and the Holy Spirit 
and the Virgin mary? It’s not like you think there is overwhelming 
evidence for all this, right? but you really do believe it nonetheless.
b: That’s right, A. I don’t believe because I think the evidence is 
overwhelming. I believe because I have faith. If you’re going to 
believe, you’ll have to have faith, too.
Here it sounds as if b is suggesting that the explanation for why he 
holds certain religious beliefs is that b has faith. Indeed, it may be that 
b is suggesting that religious faith provides a contrastive reason here. 
b believes, and A does not believe, because b has faith and A doesn’t. 
religious faith is brought forward as an explanation for the presence of 
religious belief.
Here’s a second case:
A: Why should a person believe all those things you do? I’m not just 
asking why you do believe them, but why is believing those things the 
appropriate thing to do?
b: Here again, the answer is faith. A person who has faith should 
believe these things. maybe someone who doesn’t have faith shouldn’t. 
but if you have faith, it is of course appropriate for you to believe.
This time religious faith is again invoked to explain something about 
religious belief. It is invoked to explain the epistemic appropriateness 
or justification of religious belief. religious beliefs are ones the person 
of faith should have. They are ones it is appropriate for the person of 
faith to have. religious faith is invoked to explain the positive normative 
epistemic status of religious belief.5
Neither of the above conversations is uncommon. It is a quite ordinary 
occurrence for people to appeal to the explanatory priority of faith to 
belief in this way. but if we take these claims at face value, then the model 
of faith proposed in the previous section has significant advantages over 
many other contemporary models. For, many contemporary models 
simply identify faith with religious belief or with some attitude which 
5 I’m not trying to insist on any particular epistemic property here. When I talk of 
“appropriateness” or “justification” or “what should be believed” I am simply thinking 
of the belief as having some positive normative status. Thus, b’s claim is that faith explains 
the positive normative status (whatever it is) of religious belief.
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stands in for religious belief.6 but identifying these two will surely fail to 
make sense of the explanatory priority of one to the other.
To see this, suppose that we identify faith with religious belief. Then 
in the first conversation, what b is saying is that he believes the things 
he believes because he does. This is hardly an explanation. rather, it 
sounds like a refusal to offer an explanation. even worse, this view has b 
reporting a tautology to A: if A is going to believe, he will have to believe. 
It could be that this is what b is doing. but, surely understanding his 
speech in this way is not to take him at face value. At face value, b really 
does offer an explanation for why he believes, and he tells A something 
of significance when he tells A that if he is going to believe, he will have 
to have faith. Thus, identifying faith with religious belief will not allow us 
to take b’s talk in the first case at face value.
Nor will it allow us to take b’s talk in the second case at face value. 
If we identify faith and belief in the second case, then b is saying that 
the person who holds religious beliefs should hold those beliefs because 
she does. There are some epistemologists who have flirted with the idea 
that believing a proposition gives a person some reason to believe that 
proposition,7 but it is surely a bit much to say that a person ought to 
believe something because she does! b seems to be claiming a more 
favourable epistemic status for religious belief that than which it might 
receive by simply being had. If we want to take b at face value, then we 
cannot identify faith with religious belief.
models which identify religious faith with religious belief or with 
some stand-in for religious belief fail to treat these exchanges at face 
value, then.8 but modelling faith as an epistemic disposition along the 
6 Swinburne (2005) discusses a model of faith where faith consists in beliefs in 
propositions with religiously significant content. He calls the model the “Thomist” 
model. An example of a model which takes faith as something short of belief is Alston’s 
(1996) acceptance model. 
7 See for instance (mcGrath 2007), who defends this view as the heart of “epistemic 
conservatism”. others have resisted mcGrath’s sort of conservatism, arguing for more 
limited varieties (see, e.g., [Foley 1983], [Kvanvig 1989], [Vahid 2004]).
8 A similar point applies to bishop’s (2007) doxastic venture model of faith. For, 
on his view, religious faith is a commitment to employing certain believed religious 
propositions in one’s practical reasoning, while recognizing that these propositions aren’t 
adequately supported by one’s evidence. but this view will not allow us to make sense of 
the explanatory priority of faith to religious belief. If anything, the order of explanation 
will go the other way around. Faith on this model won’t be able to explain the presence 
or appropriateness of religious belief. It only explains why persons who already have 
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lines proposed in the previous section can make good sense of both 
exchanges. Indeed, it can explain how the claims about the explanatory 
priority of faith may be quite correct.
Take first the claim that religious faith explains the presence of 
religious belief. If we understand faith as an epistemic disposition, then 
this claim is quite easy to make sense of. Why do some persons hold 
religious beliefs while others do not? The answer is faith. Some persons 
are disposed to have these beliefs in the presence of certain mental states 
and others are not. When those who are disposed in this way host the 
requisite mental states, they tend to hold the religious beliefs in question. 
They hold them because of the way they are disposed. They hold them 
because of their faith. So, the present model can make sense of the claim 
that religious faith explains the presence of religious belief.
It can also make sense of the claim that religious faith explains 
the appropriateness of religious belief. To see this, we need to reflect 
briefly on how epistemic dispositions more generally contribute to the 
appropriateness of beliefs. The examples of section one are a helpful 
guide here. recall the example of my disposition in the presence of visual 
experiences of black cats to believe I am seeing a black cat. How can this 
disposition contribute to the appropriateness of my beliefs? As a first 
pass, it seems that it can do so by being that by virtue of which my mental 
states incline me to believe that I’m seeing a black cat. For instance, 
imagine that I have this disposition and that I come to have an experience 
as of seeing a black cat. my experience then inclines me, by virtue of 
my disposition, to believe that I’m seeing a black cat. And nothing else 
prevents me from being so inclined. In such a case, it seems plausible 
that believing that I’m seeing a black cat is epistemically appropriate, and 
that my disposition has contributed to its appropriateness.
more generally, a thesis like the following seems quite attractive:
(D) If a subject S’s mental states m incline S to take attitude A by 
virtue of a disposition D to take A in the presence of states like m, 
and none of S’s other mental states prevent this inclination,9 then it is 
appropriate for S to take attitude A.
religious beliefs deliberate and behave in a certain way. Thus, the epistemic disposition 
model discussed here has the same advantage over bishop’s doxastic venture model that 
it has over the Thomistic and acceptance models.
9 I add this clause because of cases where one’s evidence causes one to have a prima 
facie, but not an ultima facie inclination to take a certain attitude. In such cases, though 
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If thesis D or something much like it is true, then the epistemic 
disposition model of faith can explain quite well how religious faith could 
explain the appropriateness of religious belief. For, it could be that the 
religious believer comes to hold her beliefs when, by virtue of her faith, 
her mental states incline her to take these beliefs. That is, the religious 
believer has a disposition in the presence of certain mental states to hold 
certain religious beliefs (i.e., her faith), and when she comes to host these 
mental states they incline her toward these religious beliefs by virtue 
of this disposition. When this occurs, thesis D says that holding these 
religious beliefs is appropriate. And, part of the explanation for why they 
are appropriate is her faith – her disposition to hold them in the presence 
of those mental states which have so inclined her to these beliefs.
So, if thesis D or something much like it is true, then the epistemic 
disposition model of faith can explain how religious faith explains the 
appropriateness of religious belief. b’s remark may be quite accurate: 
faith makes a difference to the appropriateness of religious belief. but, is 
D or something like it true? I cannot argue at great length here that it is. 
but let me offer a brief defence.
The primary reason I know of for accepting a thesis like D is its 
explanatory power. Specifically, thesis D offers a unified explanation 
of diverse but plausible cases where beliefs have positive normative 
epistemic status. I’ll talk here about three such cases – cases involving 
natural and artificial signs, cases involving moral emotions, and cases 
involving intuition.
Start with cases involving natural and artificial signs. The distinction 
between natural and artificial signs goes back at least as far as Thomas 
reid.10 An artificial sign is a sign which signifies what it does in virtue of 
some tacit agreement among people, while a natural sign signifies what it 
does in some other way. For instance, the word “pigs” artificially signifies 
pigs, while smoke naturally signifies fire.
one is disposed to take the relevant attitude in the presence of some of her evidence, 
other evidence of hers prevents her from being so inclined in light of all of her evidence. 
For instance, when I look at the mueller-lyer lines, my experience gives me a prima 
facie inclination to believe that the lines are of different lengths. but, since I know better, 
it does not give me an ultima facie inclination to believe they are different lengths. my 
knowledge prevents me from being inclined in light of all of my evidence to believe the 
lines are of different length. Thus, I add this clause to D so that D will not imply that in 
this sort of case I am justified in believing that which I am only prima facie inclined to 
believe. 
10 See (Yaffe and Nichols 2009), who say the distinction goes back further. 
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These signs are thought by reid and others to play an important role 
in determining what is appropriate for a person to believe. Consider some 
examples. It might, by virtue of my seeing smoke, become epistemically 
appropriate for me to believe that there is a fire. or, it might, by virtue 
of my seeing the sentence “The democrats lost four seats in the house,” 
become epistemically appropriate for me to believe that there is a sentence 
reporting that the democrats lost four seats in the house. of course, this 
need not be so. It is equally possible that I have these experiences and 
that the aforementioned beliefs not be appropriate.
A thesis like D can help to explain the difference between those cases 
where my experiences make the corresponding beliefs appropriate and 
those cases where they do not. In those cases where my experience of 
smoke does make it appropriate for me to believe that there is a fire it 
is because my experience, by virtue of my disposition in the presence 
of like experiences to believe that there is a fire, inclines me to believe 
that there is a fire. In those cases where my experience of the sentence 
makes it appropriate for me to believe that there is a sentence reporting 
that the democrats lost four seats, it is because my experience, by virtue 
of my disposition in the presence of like experiences to believe that 
there is a sentence with such contents, has inclined me to believe that 
I just read a sentence with such contents. by contrast, where I have these 
experiences but the same attitudes are not appropriate, it may be because 
I do not have the relevant dispositions working in the same way.
D also helps to explain the epistemic appropriateness of believing 
certain moral claims on the basis of moral emotions. one way this may go 
is as follows. Suppose I consider the claim that torturing babies for fun is 
morally wrong. I reflect on the claim, I imagine scenarios involving this 
sort of harsh treatment, and I have a feeling of disgust or horror as a result. 
Further, I have a disposition when I have such experiences to believe 
that what I’m contemplating is morally wrong. So, as I contemplate the 
envisioned scenario and react with disgust or horror to it, this inclines 
me by virtue of my aforementioned disposition to believe that torturing 
babies for fun is morally wrong. In this way, thesis D can help to explain 
how certain moral beliefs might be epistemically appropriate as well. 
They are appropriate because some mental state like a moral emotion 
inclines the subject to these beliefs by virtue of a disposition she has in 
the presence of such emotions to take these attitudes.
Finally, thesis D also allows for a powerful explanation of the nature 
and justificatory power of intuition. Consider, for instance, the intuition 
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that the fact that I will teach class tomorrow doesn’t explain why I have 
the evidence I currently do concerning my teaching tomorrow. For me, 
this  intuition is very powerful. It is intuitively clear to me that what 
explains why I have the evidence I do about whether I will teach tomorrow 
is a  body of present and past facts, rather than the fact that I will in 
fact teach tomorrow. Now, I might contemplate the proposition that my 
teaching tomorrow does explain why I have the evidence I currently do 
and in light of this intuition, come to disbelieve this proposition. And, 
plausibly, my doing so would be epistemically appropriate in light of the 
force of my intuition.
Thesis D can offer an explanation for why this is so. For, reports 
about intuitions are plausibly understood as reports about epistemic 
dispositions. my intuition that my teaching class tomorrow doesn’t 
explain my current evidence is just a disposition to disbelieve that my 
teaching tomorrow does explain my current evidence upon considering 
the claim that it does. or, perhaps, it is a disposition, upon considering this 
proposition in light of a grasp of certain conceptual connections, to 
disbelieve that the teaching explains the evidence. Thus, thesis D can 
explain how intuition can make beliefs epistemically appropriate since 
intuition is just one particularly forceful kind of disposition.11
Indeed, thesis D provides a unified account of these difficult-to-
explain yet plausible cases of justification. each of the foregoing types of 
cases – the cases involving natural and artificial signs, the cases involving 
moral emotions, and the cases involving intuition – is a plausible case 
of epistemically appropriate belief. Thesis D offers a unified explanation 
for why these attitudes are epistemically appropriate. These attitudes are 
appropriate because some mental state or states of the subjects incline 
them to take these attitudes by virtue of a disposition they have in the 
presence of such mental states to take these attitudes. In the case of 
natural and acquired signs, an experience does this; in the case of moral 
belief an emotion does this, and in the case of intuition a thought or 
episode of considering along with an adequate grasp of certain concepts 
does this. In all three cases, then, D provides a powerful explanation for 
how it is that the subjects have the epistemic properties we take them to 
have. Thus, thesis D has a great deal of explanatory power.12
11 Similar accounts of intuition are offered by (Sosa 2007a) and (Swinburne 2001). 
12 of course, in order to have a fully satisfying inference to the best explanation, I need 
to show that other available explanations of the same data are either not equally or more 
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This is not to say that there are no objections to D. The internalist might 
object to D on the basis that it allows dispositions of which the subject is 
unaware to contribute to what is epistemically appropriate to believe.13 
but there is an easy fix to D for this – just restrict the dispositions in D to 
ones of which the subject is aware. So long as a subject can be aware of her 
faith – which b’s remarks above seem to make plausible – this modified 
version of D would still lend credence to the claim that religious faith 
could explain the epistemic appropriateness of religious belief. Another 
objection might be that D allows weird or even seemingly irrational 
dispositions to contribute to what is epistemically appropriate to believe. 
Again, we might modify D so that only reliable or virtuous dispositions 
can contribute to epistemic appropriateness.14 If it can be defended that 
faith is a reliable or virtuous disposition – theses which persons of faith 
have found attractive15 – then again this will make perfectly intelligible b’s 
claim that religious faith explains the appropriateness of religious belief. 
or, we might instead reply that these seemingly irrational dispositions 
contribute to epistemic appropriateness, but that there are more valuable 
epistemic properties beyond this appropriateness. For instance, it might 
be that when a person believes in accordance with the dispositions she 
has (whether virtuous or reliable or not), she fulfils her proper function; 
but, when a person believes in accordance with virtuous or reliable 
dispositions, she fulfils her proper function with excellence. Thus, even if 
faith weren’t reliable or virtuous, it could contribute at least to epistemic 
appropriateness, as b insists.
So, there is good reason to believe that a thesis in the neighbourhood 
of thesis D is correct. And, given this result, the epistemic disposition 
model of faith not only accommodates the idea that faith might 
explain the presence of religious belief, but that faith might explain the 
adequate. but pursuing this end would take us too far afield in this paper.
13 one reason why the internalist might object in this way is that allowing dispositions 
of which one is unaware to contribute to epistemic appropriateness will conflict with the 
subject’s perspective objection. This objection, originally discussed in (bonjour 1980), 
is that accounts which allow beliefs the truth of which would be an accident from the 
subject’s perspective to be appropriate must be wrong. If D allows dispositions of which 
one is unaware to contribute to epistemic appropriateness, then it will allow for attitudes 
whose truth would be an accident from the subject’s perspective to be appropriate. 
14 If we make use of virtues, the account may resemble (Zagzebski 1996) or (Sosa 
2007b). If we make use of reliability, the account may resemble (Goldman 1979).
15 Aquinas, from whom I have derived much inspiration for the present model, is one 
famous defender of the claim that faith is a virtue – a theological virtue.
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appropriateness of religious belief. Since other models of faith cannot do 
this, we have here a first attractive feature of the epistemic disposition 
model which favours it over other models.
III. FAITH AND eVIDeNCe, FAITH AND VolITIoN, 
AND FAITH AND DoubT
In this section, I want to discuss a second attractive feature of the 
epistemic disposition model: it accommodates a variety of historically 
significant perspectives concerning the relationships between faith and 
evidence, faith and volition, and faith and doubt.
What I mean by this claim is the following. The general model of faith 
outlined above can be filled in so as to yield more narrow accounts of faith 
friendly toward a variety of different and opposing answers to significant 
questions about the relationships between faith and evidence, faith and 
volition, and faith and doubt. For example, if someone is attracted to 
the view that faith requires sufficient evidence and doesn’t go beyond it, 
then she can fill in the general model above so as to yield an account of 
faith friendly toward that perspective. or, on the other hand, if someone 
is attracted to the view that faith necessarily goes beyond the evidence, 
then she can fill in the general model above so as to yield an account of 
faith friendly toward this perspective. And similarly for questions about 
faith and volition and faith and doubt.
This is an attractive feature of the present general model, I contend. 
For, what we want is a model of religious faith which makes sense of 
the significant debates about these relationships which have endured 
through the centuries. If our general model of faith makes answering 
questions about these relationships easy, then there is a problem with our 
model. Thus, the fact that the general epistemic disposition model does 
not rule out historically significant perspectives about these relationships 
is another positive feature in favour of the model. modelling faith in this 
way allows us to make sense of these significant debates. What has been 
going on in such debates is that we have been debating how to fill in the 
details of the general model of faith proposed here.
I take it, then, that if the present model does accommodate these 
various perspectives about faith, this is another positive feature in its 
favour. I will spend the rest of this section showing that the present 
model does accommodate these various perspectives.
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begin with the relationship between faith and evidence. As 
I briefly mentioned above, there are at least two historically significant 
and opposing positions concerning the relationship between faith 
and evidence. on the one hand are those who think of faith as reasonable. 
In the extreme, this view has it that the person of faith holds her religious 
beliefs on the basis of publicly available evidence which adequately 
supports those beliefs. on this view, the person of faith does not go 
beyond what her evidence supports in holding her religious beliefs. 
Someone impressed with natural theology may be inclined toward 
a position like this.16 opposing this view are accounts of faith according 
to which the person of faith goes significantly beyond reason in holding 
her religious beliefs. When she holds these beliefs, she doesn’t do so on 
the basis of publicly available evidence which adequately supports those 
beliefs. Perhaps when she holds these beliefs, she isn’t holding beliefs 
which her evidence disconfirms, but neither is she holding beliefs which 
her evidence confirms. by faith, she believes that which is not adequately 
supported by her evidence. 17
The epistemic disposition model of faith can accommodate either of 
these perspectives about the relationship between faith and evidence. 
Someone who holds to the first perspective can narrow the realization 
conditions of faith so as to include only mental states whose content 
objectively confirms the propositions which the person is disposed 
by faith to believe. one way this may go is as follows. many theistic 
arguments begin with some observation and argue that, given this 
observation, it is very likely or even necessary that some proposition of 
religious significance is true. The person of faith may be the one who 
is disposed, upon believing these observation claims, to believe the 
relevant propositions of religious significance. For instance, she may be 
disposed upon believing that everything with a beginning has a cause, 
to believe that God is the creator of the universe. The natural theologian 
would insist that when the person of faith here believes that God is 
the creator of the universe, she does so on the basis of evidence which 
objectively confirms that judgment – the observation that everything 
with a beginning has a cause. This will be so even if the person is ignorant 
16 See, e.g., (Swinburne 2005).
17 This perspective is embraced to varying degrees by philosophers as diverse as 
Plantinga (2000) and Hick (1989). It is, of course, associated with the Kierkegaardian 
tradition as well – see (evans 1985). 
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of the argument from the one claim to the other, that is, ignorant of the 
work of the natural theologian. Thus, by requiring that the realization 
conditions of faith objectively confirm the propositions which the person 
of faith is disposed by her faith to believe, someone attracted to this first 
perspective about the relationship between faith and evidence can specify 
the epistemic disposition model to accommodate her perspective.
on the other side, the person who believes that the person of faith 
goes beyond the evidence in holding her religious beliefs can also specify 
the epistemic disposition model to accommodate her perspective. She 
simply will not impose a requirement that the realization conditions of 
faith include only mental states whose content objectively confirms the 
propositions which the person of faith is disposed to believe. Indeed, if she 
wished, she could make these realization conditions rather all-inclusive. 
on this extreme version of the view, faith would be a disposition to 
believe propositions of religious significance pretty well no matter what 
mental states one finds oneself in. Here the person of faith is surely going 
quite beyond her evidence when she holds her religious beliefs.
move to the second relationship – that between faith and volition. on 
one side of this issue are those who claim that holding religious beliefs 
by faith involves a significant volitional component. The person of faith 
takes a leap when she accepts her religious beliefs, and her leaping is 
very much up to her.18 She makes a decision, by faith, to take on these 
commitments. on the other side are those who emphasize that faith is 
a gift infused in the religious believer by a source outside of herself, and 
that the person who believes by faith deserves no credit for believing as 
she does. on this view, believing by faith involves little if any volitional 
element. The person of faith simply finds herself being drawn to her 
religious beliefs and then believing them.19
Again, the epistemic disposition model can accommodate either of 
these perspectives. Take the view according to which believing by faith 
does involve a significant volitional element first. Someone attracted to 
this perspective might further specify the epistemic disposition model by 
making it clear that faith is a resistible disposition. It is like a disposition 
I recently discovered that I have concerning gelato. on a recent visit to 
Italy, I learned that I have a disposition upon seeing gelato for sale after 
18 evans (1985) provides an example of this view, as of course does William James (1896).
19 I am thinking here primarily of persons within the Calvinist or other theological 
determinist traditions.
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eating dinner to buy some. but, I also learned that, thankfully, this is 
a resistible disposition. I don’t have to cave in. Though seeing the gelato 
does incline me to buy some, I can exercise my executive decision-making 
power and say “no.” Someone who thinks that believing by faith involves 
a significant volitional element may wish to say the same about faith. 
Faith is a disposition to believe propositions of religious significance. but 
it is a resistible disposition. The person who has faith can say “no”. or, she 
can take a leap and say “yes”. Faith encourages the leap, and it may even 
be that everyone who has faith takes the leap, but faith doesn’t determine 
the leap.20
on the other side, someone who wishes to maintain that believing 
by faith is not radically up to us may wish to maintain that faith is an 
irresistible disposition. It is like my disposition upon falling forward to 
stick out my hands in order to prevent falling flat on my face. I’m disposed 
to behave this way when I fall forward. And, since it happens as such a 
gut reaction of mine, I can’t do anything to resist it – it has the status of 
a reflex. We might say the same about faith, maintaining that the person 
of faith is irresistibly disposed to believe. It’s as if she has received a new 
nature and that believing is simply reflex-like for this new nature.
Consider finally the relationship between faith and doubt. According 
to some, the person of faith cannot have any doubts about her religious 
convictions. She believes them with absolute subjective certainty. 
Anything less than this would be less than a full religious commitment.21 
others maintain that faith is not incompatible with doubt. The person 
of faith may say, “I believe. Help my unbelief.” She may even go through 
extended periods of time where her religious convictions are rather faint 
before returning to a more confident belief.
unsurprisingly, the epistemic disposition model may be developed 
so as to accommodate either of these perspectives as well. Someone who 
wishes to maintain that faith rules out doubt can specify that the attitudes 
toward propositions of religious significance which faith disposes one 
to take must be attitudes implying subjective certainty. Someone who is 
only disposed to hold religious convictions faintly, on this view, will not 
have faith. on the other side, someone who wishes to allow that faith and 
doubt are compatible can specify that the attitudes toward which faith 
20 For a recent defence of the idea that dispositions may explain and encourage behaviour 
without determining it in a sense that eliminates free choice, see (o’Connor 2009).
21 Al-Ghazali (2001) and Tennant (1989) furnish examples of this perspective. 
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disposes someone needn’t imply subjective certainty. Someone who is 
disposed to believe, even perhaps with a low degree of confidence, can 
still have faith on this picture.
This is a second feature which reflects well on the epistemic 
disposition model, then. This model can accommodate each of the above 
historically significant positions concerning the relationships between 
faith and evidence, faith and volition, and faith and doubt. The general 
model does not settle these important questions, and that is a positive 
feature of the model as a general model of how to understand religious 
faith. Since other models of faith do settle these questions, the present 
model is preferable to them insofar as they are offered as general models.
IV. relIGIouS FAITH AND oTHer TYPeS oF FAITH
Thus far I have presented the epistemic disposition model of faith and 
shown that it has two significant advantages over other contemporary 
models of faith. There are other features of the epistemic disposition 
model which are surely worthy of investigation. For instance, it would 
be profitable to discuss how this model accommodates the idea that a 
person might grow in her faith, and how it accommodates the idea that 
persons can be saved in a religious sense through their faith. but I can 
only do so much here. I’ll close by discussing one more feature of the 
present model – its implications concerning the relationship between 
religious faith and other types of faith.
We use the term “faith” in many contexts other than religious ones. 
We say, for instance, that a wife has “faith” in her husband’s marital 
faithfulness to her. We say that a player has “faith” in his teammates. We 
say that we have “faith” in our abilities. We say that we have “faith” in 
some authority. It would be desirable for a model of faith to explain how 
these various uses might be unified. The present model of religious faith 
as an epistemic disposition, I believe, can very easily explain how these 
uses are unified, whereas other models fail at this.
The epistemic disposition model of religious faith has it that faith is 
an epistemic disposition to take certain attitudes toward propositions of 
religious significance. A very natural way to extend this model to other 
domains would be as follows. Faith in whatever domain D is an epistemic 
disposition to take certain attitudes toward propositions of significance 
in domain D. Thus, for instance, faith in one’s teammate is an epistemic 
disposition to take certain attitudes toward propositions of significance 
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concerning team sports. Faith in one’s abilities is an epistemic disposition 
to take certain attitudes toward propositions of significance concerning 
one’s abilities. Faith in an authority is an epistemic disposition to take 
certain attitudes toward propositions concerning which this authority 
has testified. And so on. Faith, in whatever domain, is an epistemic 
disposition to take attitudes toward propositions of significance in that 
domain.
In this way, we can explain how our talk of faith in various domains is 
unified. And, further, it is clear upon reflection that the accounts of faith 
in these various domains yielded by extending the epistemic disposition 
model are quite attractive accounts of faith in those domains. I’ll illustrate 
this by focusing on the merits of the epistemic disposition model as it is 
applied to faith in oneself and faith in authorities.
There has been a surge of interest in the way in which trust in oneself 
and in the testimony of others works in recent epistemology.22 much has 
been written concerning whether and when trusting oneself and trusting 
others is appropriate, and concerning how such trust might contribute 
to which attitudes are appropriate for one to take. It has become widely 
accepted that trusting oneself is an unavoidable rational requirement. 
And it has been argued that if trusting oneself is a rational requirement 
then so is trusting others, in the absence of defeaters. Interestingly, trust 
of these types is sometimes described using the language of faith.23
but while much has been said concerning whether and when trusting 
or having faith is appropriate and concerning how trusting might 
contribute to which attitudes are appropriate for a person to take, less 
has been said concerning the basic nature of trusting or having faith. 
And, regrettably, some recent and quick treatments of this topic are 
a  it wanting. one common mistake is to treat faith or trust as a kind of 
meta-belief. Trust in oneself is treated as believing that one is a reliable 
believer, while trust in another is treated as believing that the other is 
a reliable testifier.24 but this sort of account is surely wrong, because 
persons who don’t yet have a concept of reliability can still trust. And, 
more sophisticated believers can trust even if they believe a person is 
22 See, e.g., (Fricker 1995), (Goldman 2001), (Foley 2001), and (Koenig and Harris 
2007). 
23 This is especially so for Foley (2001). 
24 linda Zagzebski presented a view like this at the 2011 International Philosophy of 
religion Conference in Krakow, Poland, in preparation for her upcoming oxford Wilde 
lectures. 
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rather unreliable. In fact this isn’t so uncommon. A person may know 
full well that an acquaintance has failed to make good on his promises in 
the past, but when he sincerely insists this one last time that he really will 
do what he says, she may trust him despite his unreliability. Some other 
model of trust in oneself and in others is therefore needed. 
I propose that the models of these inspired by the epistemic 
disposition model of religious faith will do quite well. rather than saying 
that faith or trust in another is a meta-belief about reliability, we should 
say that faith in another is an epistemic disposition to believe what 
the other testifies. Faith in oneself is similarly not a meta-belief about 
one’s reliability, but a disposition to believe that to which one’s faculties 
testify. The person who has faith in herself is disposed to believe that 
which seems right to her, whereas the person who has faith in another 
is disposed to believe that to which the other testifies. This faith may 
be more or less strong, depending upon the circumstances which serve 
as the realization conditions of the disposition. unwavering trust in 
another would be a disposition to believe what the other says no matter 
what evidence one might possess to the contrary. We might have similar 
unwavering trust in certain of our faculties.
The epistemic disposition model of religious faith can therefore be 
extended to provide attractive accounts of faith in other domains. And 
there is a straightforward explanation of what unifies these diverse 
manifestations of faith. That the present model of religious faith yields 
such an explanation of the relationship between religious faith and other 
kinds of faith is just one more positive feature in its favour.
And it is a positive feature which other proposals fail to have. For, 
according to many contemporary models, what makes faith faith is 
simply its content – usually a religious content. Faith is conceived of as 
simply religious belief or perhaps religious knowledge.25 but such models 
fail to explain the relationship between religious faith and other kinds of 
faith.26 The present model does not fail to do this, but does it quite well. 
Thus, the present model is favourable to these.
CoNCluSIoN
In this paper, I introduced and explained the epistemic disposition 
model of religious faith. I argued that this model has three attractive 
25 (Plantinga 2000) would provide an example of the latter model of faith. 
26 This objection to these models is pressed at length in (bishop 2010). 
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features which favour it over competing models of religious faith. First, 
it accommodates the ideas that religious faith might explain the presence 
and appropriateness of religious belief. Second, it is amenable to a variety 
of historically significant perspectives concerning the relationships 
between faith and evidence, faith and volition, and faith and doubt. 
Finally, it yields an attractive explanation of the relationship between 
religious faith and other kinds of faith. For these reasons, I recommend 
the present model to anyone working on the concept of faith.
bIblIoGrAPHY
al-Ghazâlî. 2001. Deliverance from Error and Mystical Union with the Almighty: 
Al-Munquidh Min Al-Dalâl, G. F. mclean, trans. (Washington DC: Council 
for research in Values and Philosophy)
Alson, William. 1996. “belief, acceptance, and religious faith”, in J. Jordan and 
D. Howard-Snyder (eds.), Faith, Freedom, and Rationality: Philosophy of 
Religion Today (london: rowman & littlefield)
Audi, robert. 1994. “Dispositional beliefs and Dispositions to believe”, Nous 28
bishop, John. 2010. “Faith”, In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. edward 
N. Zalta. Available online at url = <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/faith/>
bishop, John. 2007. Believing by Faith: An Essay in the Epistemology and Ethics of 
Religious Belief (oxford: Clarendon Press)
bonjour, lawrence. 1980. “externalist Theories of empirical Knowledge”, 
Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5
Conee, earl and Feldman, richard. 2008. “evidence”, In Epistemology; New 
Essays, ed. Quentin Smith (New York: oxford university Press)
evans, C. Stephen. 1985. Philosophy of Religion: Thinking About Faith (Downers 
Grove Il: InterVarsity Press)
Fara, michael. 2006. “Dispositions”, In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
ed. edward N. Zalta. Available online at url = <http://plato.stanford.edu/
entries/dispositions/>
Foley, richard. 1983. “epistemic Conservatism”, Philosophical Studies 43
Foley, richard. 2001. Intellectual Trust in Oneself and Others (Cambridge: 
Cambridge university Press)
Fricker, elizabeth. 1995. “Telling and Trusting: reductionism and Anti-
reductionism in the epistemology of Testimony”, Mind 104 (414)
Goldman, Alvin. 1979. “What is Justified belief?”, reprinted in Epistemology: 
An Anthology, ed. ernest Sosa and Jaegwon Kim (malden: blackwell, 2000)
Goldman, Alvin. 2001. “experts: Which ones Should You Trust?”, Philosophy 
and Phenomenological Research lXIII (1)
128 T. rYAN bYerlY
Hajek, Alan. 2009. “Interpretations of Probability”, In Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, ed. edward N. Zalta. Available online at url = <http://plato.
stanford.edu/entries/probability-interpret/>
Hick, John. 1989. An Interpretation of Religion: Human Responses to the 
Transcendent (New Haven, CT: Yale university Press)
Huber, Franz and Schmidt-Petri, Christoph eds. 2009. Degrees of Belief (New 
York: Springer) James, William, 1896/1956. The Will to Believe and Other 
Essays in Popular Philosophy, and Human Immortality (New York: Dover)
Koenig, m. A. and P. l. Harris. 2007. “The basis of epistemic Trust: reliable 
Testimony or reliable Sources?”, Episteme 4(3)
Kvanvig, Jonathan. 1989. “Conservatism and its Virtues”, Synthese 79
mcGrath, matthew. 2007. “memory and epistemic Conservatism”, Synthese 157
o’Connor, Timothy. 2009. “Agent-Causal Power”, in Dispositions and Causes, ed. 
Toby Handfield (New York: oxford university Press)
Plantinga, Alvin. 2000. Warranted Christian Belief (New York: oxford university 
Press)
Sosa, ernest 2007a. “Intuitions: their Nature and epistemic efficacy”, Grazer 
Philosophische Studien 74, no.1
Sosa, ernest. 2007b. A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, 
Volume 1 (New York: oxford university Press)
Swinburne, richard. 2001. Epistemic Justification (oxford: Clarendon Press)
Swinburne, richard. 2005. Faith and Reason, 2nd ed. (oxford: oxford university 
Press)
Tennant, F.r., 1943. The Nature of Belief (london: Centenary Press)
Vahid, Hamid. 2004. “Varieties of epistemic Conservatism”, Synthese 141
Williamson, Timothy. 2000. Knowledge and its Limits (New York: oxford 
university Press)
Yaffe, Gideon and Nichols, ryan. 2009. “Thomas reid”, in Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy, ed. edward N. Zalta. Available online at url = <http://plato.
stanford.edu/entries/reid/>
Zagzebski, linda. 1996. Virtues of the Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge university 
Press) 
